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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RELIANCE ON
RACIAL "STIGMA" AS A CONSTITUTIONALCONCEPT
IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Andrew F. Halaby*
Stephen R. McAllister**
This Article focuses on one of the asserted costs of affirmative action:
stigmatization. The Article offers structure to the debate over the
definition and constitutional significance of the concept of
"stigmatization" in the affirmative action context. In addition, this
Article sets forth a model for analyzing "stigma" as a constitutional
concept, identifies particular strains of stigma on which the Supreme
Court has relied and analyzes the Supreme Court's use of the concept
of "stigma" in affirmative action cases.
INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty-five years, the constitutionality and political
expediency of affirmative action has dominated the American de-
bate over race.1 Various advantages and disadvantages, or benefits
and costs, arguably associated with affirmative action programs fre-
quently have been the subjects of intense debate.2 This Article
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1992, University of Kansas; J.D. 1996, University of Kansas School of Law.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. B.A. 1985,
University of Kansas; J.D. 1988, University of Kansas School of Law. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments and suggestions of Richard A.
Posner, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
Henry N. Butler, Director, Law and Organizational Economics Center, University of
Kansas.
1. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Forward-Race, Multiculturalism and the
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 822 (1995).
2. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive list, the following benefits
frequently are mentioned: (1) providing a remedy for past discrimination, e.g., Randall
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust, in ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, RACIAL
PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE 45, 50-51 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) [hereinafter
RACIAL PREFERENCE], (2) educating beneficiaries in ways that ordinarily would be
unavailable, e.g., id. at 48, (3) leveling the playing field as between beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries, see, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES 155 (1990), (4)
providing role models for youth of the beneficiary class or group, see, e.g., Kenneth L.
Karst, Citizenship, Race and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1988), (5)
increasing the wealth of the beneficiary class, see generally id., (6) enhancing the ability
of the beneficiary class to self-govern, e.g., Kennedy, supra, at 48, (7) providing
services to the beneficiary class, e.g., DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, A NEW AMERICAN JUSTICE
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focuses on one of the asserted costs of affirmative action: stigmati-
zation.3
The concept of stigmatization is particularly important because
of the frequency with which the Supreme Court4 and opponents of
affirmative action invoke it.5 Both affirmative action's proponents
and detractors seem to accord stigmatization a near-talismanic
181-82 (1980), (8) preventing social unrest, e.g., Kennedy, supra, at 48, (9) promoting
diversity, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund & Richard H. Sander, The Art and Science of
Academic Support, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 158 n.4 (1995); Lara Hudgins, Comment,
Rethinking Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Tailoring the Cure to Remedy the Disease, 47
BAYLOR L. REV. 815, 822 (1995), and (10) eradicating stereotypes, e.g., Kennedy, supra,
at 48. See generally Stephen R. McAllister, One Anglo-Irish American's Observations on
Affirmative Action, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21(1996). Similarly, the following costs
frequently are complained of: (1) Reducing opportunities of members of the
nonbeneficiary class, e.g., Ken Feagins, 'Wanted-Diversity: White Heterosexual Males
Need Not Apply', 4 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 1, 2 (1994), (2) reducing motivation to improve
or excel for members of the beneficiary class, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF
OUR CHARACTER 88, 90, 116 (1990), (3) spending greater sums to produce the same
aggregate output, see, e.g., Nathan Glazer, Racial Quotas, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra,
at 3, 13; Thomas Sowell, Are Quotas Good for Blacks?, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra, at
415, 422-23, (4) reducing quality of output, see, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra, at 29, 37-38; Glenn C. Loury, Beyond
Civil Rights, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra, at 429, 441-43, (5) promoting racial tension,
see, e.g., MAGUIRE, supra, at 174-75, (6) dehumanizing members of the beneficiary
class, e.g., Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra, at 393,
396, (7) condescension toward the beneficiary class, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., The
Underhandedness of Affirmative Action, in RACIAL PREFERENCE, supra, at 127, 129, and
(8) stigmatization of the beneficiary class, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, The Silent Opposition
of Professors and Graduate Students to Preferential Affirmative Action Programs: 1969 and
1975, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1257 (1988); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative
Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 41-42 (1992).
3. There is, of course, an argument that stigmatization should have no bearing on
the legality of affirmative action because the existence of stigmatization is in dispute:
Undoubtedly, when Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court in 1954, the seg-
regation of blacks and whites by force of law throughout the South was a
badge of inferiority affixed by whites in an effort to retain their superior posi-
tion in a two-tiered society.... In other words, the declaration that 'separate is
inherently unequal' reflected reality: the only way to bring the quality of edu-
cation of blacks up to the level of that of whites was to integrate the schools
and eliminate the vestiges of legal segregation 'root and branch.'
That shorthand rule, however, which has become the controlling constitu-
tional doctrine for school desegregation, is essentially based on empirical data
similar to that used in Brown. As with any other empirical assertion, the truthful-
ness of the rule is only as legitimate as the facts supporting it.
James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher Education, 43
DUKE L.J. 1115, 1155-56 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
4. See infra Part Il.
5. See, e.g., SOWELL, supra note 2, at 15, 111, 125; STEELE, supra note 2, at 117, 120;
Abram, supra note 2, at 29, 41, 476 n.10; Eastland, supra note 2, at 41-42; Stephen C.
Minnich, Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative
Action, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 279, 310 (1995); Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism:
How Preferential Treatment Works Against Blacks, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1984, at 18.
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respect, often considering it dispositive in the debate6 even though
evidentiary support for the phenomenon, to the extent it exists, is
contested hotly. Indeed, affirmative action's opponents sometimes
take the position that simply because a plausible argument exists
that affirmative action may result in stigmatization," affirmative
6. E.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("Neither the favored nor the disfavored class is stigmatized in any way.");
Eastland, supra note 2, at 41 (labeling stigma as the "most damning judgment against
affirmative action").
7. Compare Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1257 (citing 1975 Carnegie study indicating
that a majority of professors and graduate students believe that "affirmative action
labels minorities in such a way that they never can be judged on merit alone"), Luis T.
Garcia et al., The Effect of Affirmative Action on Attributions about Minority Group Mem-
bers, 49 J. PERSONALITY 427, 436 (1981) (claiming that, empirically, "affirmative action
does serve to discount the role of ability in explaining the success of minority group
members and augment the lac[k] of ability in explaining their failure"), and Madeline
E. Heilman et al., Presumed Incompetent? Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts,
77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 536, 543 (1992) (citing "fairly robust" empirical data demon-
strating stigmatization through the operation of the attribution theory's discounting
process), with Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison,
101 YALE L.J. 1631, 1641 (1992) (book review) (claiming that opponents of affirmative
action are unable "to establish a direct correlation" between affirmative action and
stigmatization), Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expec-
tancies, 46 J. SOC. ISSUES 61, 70 (1990) (claiming that "the connection between [a
beneficiary's] personal circumstances and the position of [the beneficiary's] reference
group is frequently not made"), Kennedy, supra note 2, at 50-51 (arguing that intended
beneficiaries of affirmative action do not view benefits as unmerited), Rupert B. Na-
coste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative Action, 12 LAW & POL'Y
175, 179 (1990) (noting the difficulty with stigma assumption in its underlying as-
sumption that affirmative action policies are monolithic, not varying), and Nadine
Strossen, Blaming the Victim: A Critique of Attacks on Affirmative Action, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 974, 975 (1992) (claiming that no empirical evidence supports the proposition
that affirmative action diminishes self-esteem of its intended beneficiaries). See gener-
ally Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative
Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220, 1239 (1993):
The results of our study give credence to both the hopes of advocates of pref-
erential policies and the concerns of critics. There are circumstances under
which affirmative action will necessarily eliminate negative stereotypes. How-
ever, there are equally plausible circumstances under which it will not only fail
to eliminate stereotypes, but may worsen them. This occurs because job prefer-
ences may induce employers to patronize the favored workers, which in turn
may undercut their incentives to acquire necessary skills.
The empirical studies and surveys, which, as the foregoing suggests, are vast in num-
ber, ultimately appear to be hopelessly conflicted on the question of stigma as an
empirical matter. We briefly discuss this point further in Part III, infra.
8. The Supreme Court has never attempted to define "stigma" precisely in the af-
firmative action context. See Brian K. Landsberg, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Rehnquist Court Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821, 835-38, 860 (1993)
(noting uncertainty as to the meaning and role of stigma in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence).
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action is constitutionally infirm, typically under the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9
Such heavy reliance on a complex concept that the Supreme
Court has never defined has led to vague and sloppy analysis of the
stigmatization issue in the Court's affirmative action cases." This
Article offers some structure to the debate over the definition and
constitutional significance of the concept of "stigmatization" in the
affirmative action context.
The Article's focus is confined to discussions of race-based af-
firmative action; it does not consider stigmatization arguments in
the context of discrimination involving gender or disabilities, for
example. Further, the Article's scope is limited to the stigmatization
issue as between Whites and African Americans. Althouh similar
issues exist with respect to other ethnic or racial groups, we view
the White/African American paradigm as providing the clearest
framework for analysis. Moreover, the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson2
and Brown v. Board of Education,3 joint progenitors of stigmatization
as a concept having constitutional significance in interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 arose
within that paradigm and discuss the stigma concept in that con-
text.'
Part I of the Article sets forth a model for analyzing "stigma" as
a constitutional concept. This Part of the Article identifies the differ-
ent factors that determine the presence and nature of "stigma" in the
context of affirmative action. In particular, we identify four control-
ling factors: the negative attribution behind the perceived stigma,
the source of that attribution, the power held by the stigmatized
group, and the distributive posture of the stigmatized group. The
result of this model is a 16-square matrix that permits us to identify
different strains of stigma on which a court might rely in deciding
the constitutionality of affirmative action plans.
Part II of the Article utilizes the model developed in Part I to
identify the particular strains of stigma on which the Supreme Court
has relied. We begin by analyzing two of the Court's most famous
race cases, Plessy and Brown, where the Supreme Court relied to a
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See id.
11. We are aware that a number of the commentators would object to characteriza-
tion of African Americans as an "ethnic group." See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, The
Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,21 (1994).
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See, e.g., Ralph A. Rossum, Plessy, Brown, and the Reverse Discrimination Cases:
Consistency and Continuity in Judicial Approach, 28 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 785, 791-93 (1985).
15. See infra Part II.A.
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considerable extent on the perceived absence or presence of
"stigma" in justifying or rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In
particular, we identify the strain of stigma which the Court rejected
or relied upon in those two cases-which turns out to be the same
strain-and locate it in the matrix. 6 We then build from Plessy and
Brown by examining the Court's affirmative action cases of the past
twenty-five years and identifying the strains of stigma relied upon
in those cases. This analysis reveals that the Court, or individual
Justices, have relied on eight different strains of stigma identified by
the model and demonstrated by the matrix.
17
In Part III of the Article, we summarize our findings and make
some observations about the Supreme Court's use of the concept of
"stigma" in affirmative action cases. In particular, the analysis iden-
tifies several fundamental points about the Court's current reliance
on "stigma" as a concept of constitutional significance in the af-
firmative action context. First, the current, predominant view among
the Justices apparently is that the constitutionally relevant strain is
inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries. In
other words, the Court now focuses on the stigma that Whites ac-
cord to those who benefit directly from affirmative action programs.
Second, the Court has moved toward endorsing an unfounded and
unsound strain of constitutionally relevant stigma that varies from
the predominant one in both the type and source of the negative at-
tribution-racism by Whites. Both of these changes in constitutional
reasoning represent major shifts from the Court's concept of stigma
in Plessy and Brown.'8
In addition, it is readily apparent that the Court, as well as in-
dividual Justices, has not consistently relied upon any particular
concept of stigma in deciding affirmative action cases, although in-
dividual Justices' voting patterns from an outcome standpoint are
remarkably consistent. 9 This observation opens the Court to charges
of outcome-driven decisionmaking in affirmative action cases-a
charge perhaps substantiated by the further observation that only
two Justices (White and Stevens) have ever taken positions both in
favor of and against the constitutionality of particular affirmative
action programs. At a minimum, the Court's failure to endorse and
consistently rely upon a particular concept of constitutionally sig-
nificant "stigma" in affirmative action cases results in doctrinal
confusion.
16. See infra Table 2 at p. 252.
17. See infra Table 3 at p. 269.
18. See infra Tables 4 and 5 at pp. 271, 279.
19. See infra Table 3 at p. 269.
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These findings are important for obvious reasons. The two fun-
damental changes in the Supreme Court's treatment of "stigma" as a
constitutional concept-the departure from Plessy/Brown type
stigma and the endorsement of racist stigma attributed to Whites-
are subject to serious criticism. Moreover, the Court generally has
not explained or justified these shifts in its more recent opinions
and, indeed, the Court and individual Justices often invoke the tal-
isman of "stigma" without apparent concern for the sense in which
the concept is being used and perhaps for outcome-driven objec-
tives. At the least, if the Court is to rely on the concept of "stigma" as
one of constitutional relevance in the affirmative action context, the
Justices should clearly identify the strain(s) of stigma on which they
are relying and explain why such strain(s) are constitutionally rele-
vant.
I. A MODEL FOR STIGMA AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT
The term "stigma" may be defined as a negative characteriza-
tion or "mark."2 Thus, the argument that affirmative action causes
"stigmatization ' 21 essentially involves the nature of that "mark" and
the processes by which it is assigned. Not surprisingly, the concept
of "stigma" or "stigmatization," especially as used by the Supreme• 22
Court, actually has multiple senses. These senses, or strains have
different implications, rendering meaningless any notion of stigma
as a universal concept. Only by identifying and evaluating the dif-
ferent strains separately can the legitimacy of arguments against
affirmative action based on stigma effectively be judged.
20. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1158 (1986) (defining
stigma as "a mark of shame or discredit"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1197 (2d
College ed. 1985) (defining stigma as "[a] mark or token of infamy, disgrace, or re-
proach"). See also ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 2-3 (1963):
While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an
attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons avail-
able for him to be, and of a less desirable kind .... He is thus reduced in our
minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an
attribute is a stigma, especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive;
sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap.
21. "Stigmatization" is defined as "descri[ption] or identif[ication] in opprobrious
terms," WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1158 (1986),
"characteriz[ation] or brand[ing] as disgraceful or ignominious," AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1197 (2d College ed. 1985), or simply "singl[ing] out." Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 374 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
22. See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 340-41 (1994).
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In this Part of the Article, we explain the two distinct processes
that comprise our approach to the task of identifying the different
strains. First, we develop an analytical model for constitutionally
significant stigmatization from Plessy, Brown, and the affirmative
action cases. Second, we identify the potential strains by applying
the model.
A. Developing the Model
The first step in development is determining whether a single
comprehensive model or multiple models are required. A single
comprehensive model, which at least initially applies to all race-
based classifications, whether "benign" like affirmative action or
"invidious" like segregation, is the appropriate choice for two rea-
sons. The first is positive: the Supreme Court and its individual
members have envisioned stigmatization as a universal conceptre-
gardless of context, so the model should as well, if possible. The
second is normative: a comprehensive model best serves compara-
tive goals. The following equation provides a quantitative analog:
Constitutionally significant stigmatization of the group at
issue = f(xi, X. ...,x.).
where x1l, x2 ,... xn are the variables that define "stigma."
By definition, a comprehensive analytical approach requires
common elements or questions, so the second step in developing the
model is to identify these elements. They are analogous to the indi-
vidual variables x1 through x. in the quantitative analog. Analysis of
Plessy v. Ferguson,24 Brown v. Board of Education,25 and the affirmative
action cases in which the Supreme Court or individual Justices have
invoked stigmatization reveals four important factors: (1) the nega-
tive attribution underlying the stigma charged, (2) the source of that
negative attribution relative to the stigmatized group, (3) the power
held by that group, and (4) the distributive posture of that group. The
quantitative analog thus appears as
Stigmatization = f(underlying attribution, source, power,
distributive posture).
Having identified the common elements, the final step is de-
termining the range of possible solutions or answers to each
23. See infra Part II.
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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element. In the analogous quantitative equation, such possible solu-
tions are represented by hypothetical numerical values which may
be substituted for each variable. The cases and individual opinions
reveal that each common element has two identifiable potential so-
lutions.
1. Negative Attribution Underlying the Stigma Charged
The first element or "variable" evoking stigma's definition as a
negative "mark" or characterization," focuses upon the particular
nature of that mark. The underlying attribution of the stigma in
Brown was inferiority, for the Supreme Court held that African
American children were marked as inferior by segregation. 27 This
type of stigma provided a sensible focus for inquiry under the Equal
Protection Clause-inferiority contradicts equality. Theoretically, as
well aspractically, however, other negative attributions may be im-28-
posed. One could, for example, be marked as being racist, sexist,
dishonest, or harassing. Although a complicated philosophical in-
quiry may sometimes be necessary to determine which attributions
are truly "negative" and which are not, it seems safe to assume that
some may be commonly agreed upon as negative.
Because different types of attributions doubtless have different
effects, at least in the self-fulfilling prophecy sense,2 it is relevant to
discern which are invoked in each particular case. As with the other
common elements or "variables" comprising the stigmatization
26. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62.
28. See, e.g., Feagins, supra note 2, at 35 ("The force of harm caused by a loss of
benefits or opportunities because of irrelevant group-based classifications is not nec-
essarily felt as a stigma of inferiority. Rather, the harm to the victim is a denial of
complete citizenship.").
29. Inferiority traditionally has been considered the sole relevant negative attribu-
tion underlying stigma arising from race-based classifications, see infra Part II.A, for
discussions of whether such attributions are self-fulfilling and have focused on inferi-
ority or its variants. Some commentators view the phenomenon as originating in
attribution by others. For example,
if such stigmatization occurs, it can have far-reaching consequences for the ca-
reers of those targeted by affirmative action efforts. The negative expectations
of these individuals that would be spawned by a stigma of incompetence could
cause distorted perceptions of their behavior and work performance and, if
internalized by them, could actually create self-fulfilling prophecies that bring
about the very behavior others expect.
Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 543-44. Negative attribution by others may also be self-
fulfilling because "job preferences may induce employers to patronize the favored
workers, which in turn may undercut their incentives to acquire necessary skills."
Coate & Loury, supra note 7, at 1239. Shelby Steele has suggested that negative self-
attributions may also be self-fulfilling. See STEELE, supra note 2, at 116.
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model, there are two potential solutions or "values" for the underly-
ing negative attribution element. The first is inferiority, while all
potential others are lumped into a general category called other.
This division is appropriate for several reasons. First, the cases
in which the constitutional concept of stigmatization originated,
Plessy and Brown, addressed only inferiority-type stigma." Second,
this exclusive focus on inferiority persisted in the affirmative action
cases until relatively recently.31 Third, attributions of inferiority nec-
essarily bear upon the constitutional concept of equality; other
negative attributions may not.
2. Relative Source of the Negative Attribution
The cases imply a distinction based upon the identity of the
stigmatizing group; this element comprises the first element to be
considered in parsing the broad constitutional concept of "stigma,"
as expounded by the Supreme Court and its individual members,
into more precise strains. One of two "values" potentially may be
assigned. First, the stigmatized and stigmatizing groups may be one
and the same; that is, members of the group at issue may negatively
characterize themselves as a result of the race-based classification at
issue. Second, the stigmatized and stigmatizing groups may be dis-
tinct; that is, one group may stigmatize or negatively characterize
the other. 2
The distinction is most easily understood by reference to the
general definition of "stigmatization" as the phenomenon in which a
negative characterization or "mark" is assigned 3 By envisioning
that mark as a physical object, it becomes clear that the mark's
recipient is an essential party to the stigmatization process, whether
the mark is assigned by others, or self-inflicted by the recipient. But
the assignor's identity makes a difference. For example, the
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Parts III.B.5-III.B.7.
32. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 351 (1987); Morrison, supra note 22, at 340.
Commentators variously focus on different conceptions. For the view that "stigma"
means other-stigma, see Lopez, supra note 11, at 28 ("By the 1840s and 1850s, how-
ever, U.S. Anglos looked with distaste upon Mexicans in terms that conflated and
stigmatized their race and nationality."); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 942 (1989) ("Th[e stigma] approach fo-
cuses less on the concrete effects that a government action has on a group's position
and more on the message that the action conveys to others." (emphasis added)). For
the view that "stigma" means self-stigma, see Landsberg, supra note 8, at 860 ("If
stigma must be proved, what proves it: intent to stigmatize or the victim's feeling of
stigmatization?").
33. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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gravamen of Brown v. Board of Education3 was that African American
schoolchildren assigned a negative mark-feelings of inferiority-to
themselves as a result of state-enforced segregation. 35 In this regard,
the self-imposed stigma is closely akin to a lack of self-esteem.
Whether state-enforced segregation caused White children to think
less of African American children would have constituted a
different issue, although both phenomena could be described
broadly as "stigmatization."
In the affirmative action context, the difference is also clear. A
beneficiary of affirmative action may or may not doubt or think less
of herself because she is aware that her "race, ' 36 a characteristic over
which she has no control, has helped her achieve her position. A
nonbeneficiary may or may not think less of the beneficiary for the
same reason, or for others. But the two phenomena clearly differ.
For purposes of this Article, self-imposed negative attribution is
referred to as self-stigma, while other-stigma refers to negative
attributions imposed by any group not at risk of being stigmatized.38
3. Power Held by the "Stigmatized" Group
A meaningful (albeit mostly implicit) distinction arises in the
cases between stigma imposed on a politically "powerless" group
and stigma imposed on a "powerful" group. As used here, the terms
are relative; all groups, whether minority or majority, have some
political power, but assuming a clean division along group fines on
a binary issue, the majority will be powerful and the minority pow-
erless.
4. Distributive Posture of the "Stigmatized" Group
Finally, the cases manifest a distinction between stigmatization
potentially suffered by the "beneficiary" group of a race-based clas-
sification or policy and that potentially suffered by the other,
"nonbeneficiary," group. As used here, the "beneficiary" group is
the group whose immediate purposes the classification is designed
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
36. See Lopez, supra note 11, at 21 (noting the propriety of describing Whites and
African Americans as separate "ethnic" or "racial" groups).
37. Whether stigma is self-imposed or imposed by others is unrelated to the par-
ticular group for which stigmatization is an issue. Theoretically, African Americans
can stigmatize themselves or be stigmatized by Whites; Whites can also stigmatize
themselves or be stigmatized by African Americans.
38. Cf. GOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 18-19 (referring to responses to interaction with
stigmatized individuals as involving "self-consciousness" and "other-consciousness").
[VOL. 2:235
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to serve. All relevant others comprise the "nonbeneficiary" group.
Applying this definition in the segregation context, Whites were the
beneficiary group, since the immediate purpose of segregation was
to keep African Americans separate from Whites for the benefit of
Whites.39 In the affirmative action context, on the other hand, pre-
ferred" minorities constitute the beneficiary group while Whites
constitute the nonbeneficiary group; the immediate purpose of af-
firmative action is to confer positions (in schools, jobs or
construction contracts, for example) on members of or entities
within the minority group. Another way to define "beneficiaries"
and "nonbeneficiaries" is by the group challenging the classification
at issue. Although simplistic, this approach has merit-a beneficiary• • • 41
is unlikely to challenge the classification, or perhaps even to have
legal standing to do so.42
39. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 322 (noting the position that "the problem with
,separate but equal' is not the separation. The problem is that the facial equality of
segregation laws disguised the clear social hierarchy and power under Jim Crow."
(footnotes omitted)); Washburn, supra note 3, at 1133 ("Brown implied ... that inte-
gration was a matter of a white benefactor and a black beneficiary .... " (quoting J.
HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 32 (1979)). Although Wilkinson takes
issue with this implication, we do not, for it is merely a reverse of the proposition that
segregation was a matter of Whites benefiting at the expense of Blacks, at least to the
extent that Whites robbed Blacks of any choice in the matter. "There is a distinct dif-
ference between separation that derives from authoritarian imposition on a minority
and the separation that occurs as a result of choice by members of a minority group."
Washburn, supra note 3, at 1150 n.170. W.E.B. DuBois, among others, argued that
separation may serve African Americans' purposes as much as those of Whites. See
CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS 59, 64 (1993). The flaw in this
argument is (unfortunately) demonstrated in part by reference to the power-
ful/powerless distinction mentioned previously. Whites had the power to impose
segregation, and did so.
40. Some consider "preference" terminology inappropriate and misleading because
it connotes a sense of undue entitlement. See Luke C. Harris & Uma Narayan,
Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the
Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLE1TERJ. 1, 29-30 (1994); see also
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 927 (1986) (defining preference as
"the act, fact, or principle of giving advantages to some over others" (emphasis
added)). We use it anyway, for there is little doubt that under an affirmative action
program, some groups. receive benefits while others do not. Those receiving benefits
are as aptly termed "preferred" as anything else, especially when the term
"preference" may also mean "priority in the right to demand and receive satisfaction
of an obligation." Id. Although this alternative definition connotes a different concept,
it also comports with those in which the harms of past discrimination are considered
to be an "obligation" which is "repaid" through affirmative action. See, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1063-64,
1107 (1991) (identifying affirmative action as the remedy for the violations of the
colorblind principle).
41. See infra text accompanying note 163, in which Justice Stevens raises a similar
point. Yet another way to think about the beneficiary/nonbeneficiary distinction is by
reference to principles of altruism. See Lino A. Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination in Employment, 14 HARV. J.L.
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It is important to recognize that the terms "beneficiary" and
"nonbeneficiary" groups refer to those entire groups.43 Consider a
hypothetical race-based affirmative action program in which African
Americans are hired preferentially." Under our approach, African
Americans constitute the beneficiary group. There is no distinction
between those actually hired under the affirmative action program
and those hired independently of it.
B. Applying the Model
The model developed in Part L.A describes constitutionally
significant stigmatization in elemental terms as [x,-underlying attri-
bution]-type stigma from a given [x2-sourcej suffered by a group
with certain [x3-power] and in a certain [x4-distributive posture].
Substituting potential solutions or "values" for each element yields
the following equation:
Constitutionally significant stigmatization = [Inferiority or
other] [self- or other-] stigma suffered by [powerful or power-
less] [beneficiaries or nonbeneficiaries].
Each different combination of solutions comprises a distinct strain of
stigmatization. Because the model has four elements, each with two
potential solutions, theoretically there are sixteen possible strains of
& PUB. POL'Y 68, 76 (1991) (suggesting that proponents of racial preferences "assume
a level of altruism ... on the part of most Americans"); MAGUIRE, supra note 2, at 94-
95. This approach depends, in part, on the element of the stigmatized group's political
power, for only the powerful group may altruistically confer benefits on other groups.
See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 76 (1986) (defining altruism as
"unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others"). This interdependence of
elements is analytically undesirable.
42. It seems unlikely that the beneficiaries of affirmative action would have legal
standing to challenge such programs. In addition, while some women may think that
laws which in some sense favor them over men (for example, state laws. that set a
lower drinking age for women or that recognize statutory rape only as a crime against
women or that provide for a wrongful death action on behalf of the mother, but not
the father, of an illegitimate child or a federal law which requires only men to register
for the military draft) actually stigmatize women by giving credence to stereotypes.
Nonetheless, in the Supreme Court at least, the challenges to such laws generally have
been brought by the non-beneficiaries (men in this example), or at least on their behalf.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464 (1981); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981), and it seems doubtful that the Court would have thought the women (the po-
tentially stigmatized beneficiary group) to have standing to challenge the laws. The
same result would appear compelled in the affirmative action context.
43. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 341 (noting the argument against affirmative
action that "others will perceive all members of the racial group as inferior, even if all
members of the group are not beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan").
44. See supra note 40 (discussing use of "preference" terminology).
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stigma. Table 1 provides a grid of the model's sixteen possibilities,
each of which is analogous to the result when actual values are
substituted into the quantitative equation.
In the next Part, we assess the Supreme Court's treatment of
stigmatization in Plessy, Brown, and its affirmative action cases to
determine which strains the Court or individual Justices have found
constitutionally significant.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES
A. The Origins of Stigma in Constitutional Doctrine
In Plessy v. Ferguson,45 the Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of state-enforced segregation of passenger railways.
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, the Court refused to countenance the plaintiff's argument
that segregation stigmatized Blacks.48 It first noted that "[flaws
permitting, and even requiring, [the two races'] separation, in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other ... 49 It then rea-
soned that
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument [is] in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that con-
struction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if
... the colored race should become the dominant power in
the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely
similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to
an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at
least, would not acquiesce in this assumption s°
The Court's language emphasizes inferiority-type self-stigma, and in
fact hints that other-stigma is considered irrelevant.5' The Court
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. Id. at 538-40.
47. Id. at 543.
48. Id. at 550-52.
49. Id. at 544.
50. Id. at 551.
51. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 56; cf. Strauss, supra note 32, at 946 ("In Plessy,
unlike Strauder, one had to make arguments about the intangible, psychological effects
of segregation in order to show that an inequality existed.").
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hypothesizes that Whites would not experience self-stigma were
they on the receiving end of segregation, and implies that for that
reason, such a statute would not be unconstitutional. The Court
seems to recognize that other-stigma might occur, for by arguing
that "at least" Whites would not consider themselves inferior as a
result of the hypothetical statute, it implicitly acknowledges that
African Americans might feel differently. Given the Court's implicit
conclusion that the hypothetical statute would be constitutional,
however, it clearly did not consider other-stigma germane to the
constitutional issue. Further, the Court's characterization that
African Americans are stamped with a badge of inferiority only if
they "choose[] to" receive it hints at a conception of self-stigma; if
stigmatization by others was of any concern to the Court, the
stigmatized group's "choice" would be irrelevant.
The Court focused on stigma with respect to the powerless
rather than the powerful group, as indicated by both the facts of the
case and the role-reversing hypothetical. As to each, the Court con-
sidered stigmatic effects not with respect to the group enacting the
statute, but the other group.
Determining whether the Court distinguished between stigma-
tization of the beneficiary and nonbeneficiary group is more
difficult, for the Court, at least superficially, took the position that
segregation, taken alone, was essentially benefit-neutral.5 2 Perhaps
the best response is that of Justice Harlan in dissent:
Everyone knows that the statute in question had its origin
in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white per-
sons.... The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of
giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to
compel the latter to keep to themselves while travelling
[sic] in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
5 3
But even the majority could not refrain from implicitly acknowledg-
ing that the statute manifested "social prejudices" against African
Americans by Whites, the preservation of which was sought by
52. See, e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 ("The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but... it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races
upon terms unsatisfactory to either." (emphasis added)); id. at 550 ("So far, then, as a
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the
question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . .
53. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Whites in enacting the statute and which African Americans sought
to overturn. Thus, under the definition of the "beneficiary" class as
the class the immediate purposes of whom the classification is de-
signed to serve,55 Whites were the clear beneficiaries of the statute
and African Americans the nonbeneficiaries.' Similarly, the plaintiff
was an African American, so African Americans may be considered
the nonbeneficiary class on that ground 7
In Brown v. Board of Education,5 ' the Supreme Court reversed
Plessy and held that state-enforced segregation of White and African
American schoolchildren violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy's reversal resulted not from different analysis, but from the
same analysis with different results, for the Brown Court used the
same approach to stigmatization as the Plessy Court.9 In reaching its
conclusion that state-enforced separate but equal accommodations
were constitutional, the Plessy Court had answered, "not necessar-
ily," to the question whether the class of powerless nonbeneficiaries
of a race-based classification suffer from self-stigma, implicitly re-
quiring an affirmative answer to justify a finding of
unconstitutionality." In holding that state-enforced separate facili-
ties are inherently unequal,6' the Brown Court provided a definitive
answer:
To separate [African American children in grade and high
schools] from others of similar age and qualifications
54. See id. at 551-52 ("The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except
by an enforced commingling of the two races.... If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.").
55. See supra Part I.A.4.
56. See Culp, supra note 51, at 58 ("From [a Black perspective], the aim of whites
who adopted segregation as a mode of social oppression is quite clear-blacks were
oppressed precisely because the white majority believed that race mattered and that
society should give the white majority support for these claims."); Kimberl W.
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988) ("Segregation and other
forms of social exclusion . . . reinforced a racist ideology that Blacks were simply
inferior to whites and were therefore not included in the vision of America as a
community of equals.").
57. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976) (describing self-stigma as the
root of the Brown decision); Landsberg, supra note 8, at 835 ("Brown seemed to follow
Plessy in focusing on the feelings of the victim rather than on the motives of the
perpetrator of segregation."); John D. Casais, Note, Ignoring the Harm: The Supreme
Court, Stigmatic Injury, and the End of School Desegregation, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
259, 262-63 (1994) (describing "self-rejection," i.e., self-stigma undergirding of Brown).
60. See supra text accompanying note 51.
61. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone6 2
In summary, in Plessy and Brown the Supreme Court clearly identi-
fied the precise strain of stigma with which the Court was
concerned. The underlying negative attribution was inferiority. The
source of that attribution was the stigmatized group itself-African
Americans." By necessity on the facts, the Court focused on the im-
position of this inferiority-type self-stigma on powerless
nonbeneficiaries of segregation-African Americans-not stigmati-
zation of the 9owerful group or the group that "benefited" from the
classification -Whites. The Plessy/Brown strain of stigma, inferior-
ity-type self-stigma suffered by powerless nonbeneficiaries, is
shown on Table 2 by those cases' location on the grid of the consti-
tutionally significant stigmatization model 7
B. The Affirmative Action Cases
With the demise of governmentally-enforced segregation, the
Supreme Court's use of and reliance on the concept of stigma has
arisen in a different arena-affirmative action. The Court, or its
individual members, have addressed the concept in at least seven
affirmative action cases spanning the past twenty years and
culminating in its recent decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.6 In several instances, the Justices' discussions of stigma are
62. Id. at 494; see also Rossum, supra note 14, at 793; Casais, supra note 59, at 296
("The stigmatic injury of de jure segregation was the basis for federal court interven-
tion relied on by Brown I, as the Court confirmed that such discrimination sends a
message of inferiority to the children of the disfavored race."); Washburn, supra note
3, at 1121. See Rossum, supra note 14, at 788, for discussion of the Brown Court's moti-
vations in employing this rationale. But see Landsberg, supra note 8, at 824 (noting that
stigmatic injury is a possible reason for Brown's outcome, but also discussing invidi-
ous intent and irrationality of race distinctions as alternative rationales of Brown's
holding).
63. See supra Part I.A.1.
64. See supra Part I.A.2.
65. See supra Part I.A.3.
66. See supra Part I.A.4.
67. See also supra Table 1 at p. 248.
68. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The other six: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); and DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974).
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
a private affirmative action plan does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. at 209. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist implicitly invoked notions of stigma.
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quite vague and evince little, if any, analytical rigor. These opinions
often seem like an attempt to manipulate the concept of stigma,
taking advantage of its perceived legitimacy as a factor of
constitutional magnitude, while in the final analysis leaving Justices
free to achieve whatever end is sought. 9 In other cases, however, the
concept is described with sufficient clarity and analytical rigor at
least to make it possible to identify the sense or senses in which the
Court has used it.
70
1. DeFunis v. Odegaard
DeFunis 71was the Supreme Court's first attempt to address the
constitutionality of affirmative action. The majority held, in a per
curiam opinion, that the white plaintiff's equal protection claim
7 2
which was premised on his rejection for admission to a law school
that utilized a minority admissions program,73 was moot.74 The
Id. at 254. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Whether described as 'benign discrimination' or
'affirmative action,' the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged
sword that must demean one in order to prefer another.").
There are arguments that although Rehnquist reached no constitutional issue,
his conception of stigma in the statutory context is analytically indistinct from those
presented in the affirmative action cases discussed at length in this Article. First,
Rehnquist did not attempt to distinguish stigmatization arising in the statutory and
constitutional contexts. See, e.g., id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("There is perhaps no
device more destructive to the notion of equality than the numerus clausus-the
quota."). Second, assuming with Rehnquist that the principle of equality underlies
both the antidiscrimination statutes, see also MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 37 (1994), and the Equal Protection
Clause, stigmatization may have similar import for analysis of both. Finally, by ac-
knowledging the existence of a substantive difference between stigmatization in the
two contexts, Rehnquist's conception is still useful, for through his implicit reference
to a single strain, he demonstrates the nonexistence of a universally applicable con-
ception of stigma.
Nonetheless, we decline to include Rehnquist's statutory conception in our
constitutional analysis. The antidiscrimination statutes are, of course, more precise in
their prohibitions than is the Equal Protection Clause, giving rise to less need, if any,
to resort to analytical devices such as stigmatization. Further, the law is replete with
similar or identical constitutional and statutory provisions that are interpreted differ-
ently. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807
(1986) ("Although the constitutional meaning of 'arising under' may extend to all
cases in which a federal question is 'an ingredient' of the action, we have long con-
strued the statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited
power." (citation omitted)). Similarly, stigmatization may well have a different mean-
ing in the context of the antidiscrimination statutes than it has under the Constitution.
69. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
70. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 119-65.
71. 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
72. Id. at 314.
73. Id. at 320-21.
74. Id. at 319-20.
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Court concluded that the plaintiff, who was admitted to the law
school pursuant to a court order,75 would comylete his studies re-
gardless of any decision the Court might reach.
Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's finding of moot-
ness, and offered a lengthy exposition on the "merits" of the
plaintiff's case and affirmative action in general. On the issue of
stigma, he clearly invoked only one strain-inferiority-type self-
stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries: "A segregated admis-
sions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a
segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result de-
spite contrary intentions." 7  The comparison to segregated
classrooms seems a clear reference to Brown,78 wherein stigma was
more particularly considered inferiority-type self-stigma of a power-
less group.79  The obvious distinction, although apparently
unimportant to Douglas, was that African Americans were beneficiar-
ies of the affirmative action program in DeFunis whereas they were
the nonbeneficiaries of the segregation at issue in Brown.
2. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
In Bakke,80 a sharply divided Court held that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a state entity
may not rely solely on race in determining admissions to medical
school.8' A majority of the Justices, however, took the view that a
state may at least consider race as a factor in such decisions. 2
Justice Powell, who wrote the lead opinion, disparaged
stigma's value in any analysis of race-based classifications. To the
75. Id. at 314.
76. Id. at 319-20.
77. Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas also wrote that "[olne other as-
sumption must be clearly disapproved: that blacks or browns cannot make it on their
individual merit. That is a stamp of inferiority that a State is not permitted to place on
any lawyer." Id. It is unclear whether Douglas was concerned with self- or other-
stigma here, for a government's placement of a "stamp of inferiority" could be read as
essentially causing the same type of self-stigma that occurred in Brown, or it could be
read as authorizing stigmatization by others, i.e., the State, viewing the beneficiaries as
inferior.
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
80. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
81. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.). Four of the nine Justices believed that only race could be
relied upon. See id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. See id. at 320 (Powell, J.); id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
83. Id. at 295 n.34 (Powell, J.) ("In the view of Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice
WHITE, Mr. Justice MARSHALL, and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, the pliable notion of
'stigma' is the crucial element in analyzing racial classifications. The Equal Protection
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extent he considered stigma at all, he confined his analysis to inferi-
ority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries:
"[Pireferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to indi-
vidual worth."" The stereotyping concept implicates feelings by
others far more than it involves feelings about oneself. s The concept
of inability to achieve success evokes notions of inferiority; the quote
could as well have read "preferential programs may only reinforce
common stereotypes holding that certain groups are inferior and
require special protection . . . ." The references to "preferential"
treatment and "special protection" belie a concern with beneficiaries
only.
The most difficult question is whether Powell considered the
relevant inquiry to be the stigmatization of the powerless group, the
powerful group, or both. The above language, his opinion's only
substantive reference to stigma, provides no explicit answer, and it
could at least superficially be applied to either the powerful or the
powerless group. However, the overall gist of his statement suggests
a concern with only the powerless group. Stigmatization of the
powerful group, although theoretically possible, would have been a
novel concept in the wake of cases such as Plessy and Brown,86
leading one to expect an explicit invocation if so intended.
Powell's reference to achievement of success provides further
insight. Neither the inability to achieve success nor perceptions
thereof comprise meaningful issues for the politically powerful
group; its power, to some extent, marks its ability to achieve success.
Thus, to the extent one or the other can be identified as Powell's fo-
cus, it is the powerless group.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part.17 Brennan
favored analysis of "remedial" race-based classifications under an
approach later known as intermediate scrutiny:" The government
Clause is not framed in terms of 'stigma.' Certainly the word has no clearly defined
constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless." (citation
omitted)).
84. Id. at 298.
85. Cf. Coate & Loury, supra note 7, at 1220 ("An important component of [the
question of whether labor-market gains due to affirmative action can be expected to
continue without affirmative action becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market]
would seem to be the impact of affirmative action on employers' stereotypes about the
capabilities of minority workers." (emphasis added)).
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Separating Prejudice from Rationality in Equal Protection
Cases: A Legacy of Thurgood Marshall, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 98 n.40 (1994) (describing
"intermediate scrutiny" in the context of purposeful gender discrimination and citing
to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) for a description of the standard); Jon A.
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interest served by the classification must be important and the
classification itself must be substantially related to achievement of
that interest. 9 Significantly, Brennan considered stigmatization so
important that he elevated it to coequal status with intermediate
scrutiny's two usual prongs.9" To the extent precise meaning can be
gleaned from Brennan's opinion,9' he appears to have recognized
five different strains of stigma.
First, Brennan considered inferiority-type other-stigma suffered
by powerless beneficiaries. He expressed his concern with benefici-
aries and with inferiority-type stigma by declaring, "[n]or can the
program reasonably be regarded as stigmatizing the program's
beneficiaries or their race as inferior. 92
Once admitted, these students must satisfy the same de-
gree requirements as regularly admitted students ....
Under these circumstances, their performance and degrees
Ward, Note, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Do They Violate the Constitution and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 73, 84 (1991).
89. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J.).
90. Brennan wrote that
because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensi-
bly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created
by invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is
any conceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justify
such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be
shown. In addition, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or
that singles out those least well represented in the political process to bear the
brunt of a benign program.
Id. at 361; see also id. at 373-74 ("The second prong of our test-whether the Davis pro-
gram stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is reasonably
used in light of the program's objectives-is clearly satisfied by the Davis program.").
As is apparent, the precise place of stigma in Justice Brennan's analysis, as well as the
precise nature of the relationship required between the program and its objectives,
was unclear.
91. Several of Brennan's references to stigma are quite vague. For example: "Nor
has anyone suggested that the University's purposes contravene the cardinal principle
that racial classifications that stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption
that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government be-
hind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more." Id. at 357-58. It is
unclear exactly what Brennan meant by "stigmatize" here, because neither presump-
tions of inferiority nor governmental sponsoring of invidious notions necessarily mark
anyone. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. He could have meant other-
stigma because the act of classifying is by others and it is the classifying that is based
on assumptions of inferiority. But it is equally plausible that he meant self-stigma via
the presumption of inferiority underlying the classification. He cited Brown, lending a
bit of support that self-stigma was his concern, but he cited so many other cases that
no precise meaning can be ascertained. Similarly, Brennan thought that "any statute
must be stricken that stigmatizes any group," id. at 361, and that the "policy of segre-
gation . . . itself stamped Negroes as inferior." Id. at 371. No precise conception of
stigma can be ascertained from these broad statements.
92. Id. at 375.
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must be regarded equally with the regularly admitted stu-
dents with whom they compete for standing. Since
minority graduates cannot justifiably be regarded as less
well qualified by virtue of the special admissions program,
there is no reasonable basis to conclude that minority
graduates at schools using such programs would be stig-
matized as inferior by the existence of such programs.93
The concern for minority graduates clearly manifests a concern for
the powerless rather than the powerful group. Brennan's interest in
whether such graduates would be "regarded equally" with other
graduates implies a focus on other- rather than self-stigma. Al-
though he conceivably could have meant the students' regard for
themselves, common usage suggests that he more likely meant the
opinions of others. It is others, i.e., employers, who tend to view a
student's "degree[]" and "qualifi[cations]" as important.94
Second, Brennan considered whether powerful nonbeneficiar-
ies suffer from the same inferiority-type other-stigma. He wrote that
[i]t is not even claimed that Davis' program in any way
operates to stigmatize or single out any discrete and insu-
lar, or even any identifiable, nonminority group. Nor will
harm comparable to that imposed upon racial minorities
by exclusion or separation on grounds of race be the likely
result of the program.95
As indicated by his reference to the "nonminority group," the first
sentence refers to powerful nonbeneficiaries. The second sentence
implies a concern with other-stigma, for Brennan counterposed the
93. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
94. Brennan's opinion provides additional textual support for the proposition that
he specifically concerned himself with whether powerless beneficiaries suffer from
other-stigma. For example, he wrote that
race, like, 'gender-based classifications too often [has] been inexcusably util-
ized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of society.' ...
[W]e nonetheless have recognized that the line between honest and thoughtful
appraisal of the effects of past discrimination and paternalistic stereotyping is
not so clear and that a statute based on the latter is patently capable of stigma-
tizing all women with a badge of inferiority.
Id. at 360 (emphasis added). As the passage suggests, stereotyping is an apt descrip-
tion of other-stigma; one seldom stereotypes one's self. Thus, Brennan apparently
refers to powerless beneficiaries experiencing other-stigma. He also wrote that "[s]tate
programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination
obviously create the same hazard of stigma, since they may ... reinforce the views of
those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently capable of succeed-
ing on their own." Id. Again, it would be surprising if "those" refers to members of the
minority groups themselves.
95. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
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stigmatization at issue and that caused by "exclusion or separation,"
evoking Brown's self-stigma rationale and thereby implying that the
stigma at issue was something different, i.e., other-stigma. He of-
fered no explicit concern with any particular underlying attribution,
but elsewhere in his opinion he expressly referred to the stigma of
inferiority96 while offering nothing to the contrary.
Third, although he considered it unimportant as applied to af-
firmative action, Brennan at least acknowledged the potential for
powerless nonbeneficiaries to suffer from inferiority-type other-
stigma. He wrote that "race, like, 'gender-based classifications too
often [has] been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize
politically powerless segments of society.' "97 As discussed previ-
ously,98 the focus on stereotyping buttresses the conclusion that
powerless nonbeneficiaries of race-based classifications may be
subject to other-stigma, and as discussed in the preceding para-
graph, Brennan likely focused on inferiority rather than some other
negative attribution.
Fourth, Brennan implicitly acknowledged the issue of inferior-
ity-type self-stigma suffered by powerless nonbeneficiaries that had
been at issue in Brown.9 Fifth, and finally, he considered the same
issue with respect to powerful nonbeneficiaries: "[T]here is abso-
lutely no basis for concluding that Bakke's rejection as a result of
Davis' use of racial preference will affect him throughout his life in
the same way as the segregation of the Negro schoolchildren in
Brown I would have affected them."'10 Bakke represents the class of
powerful nonbeneficiaries, and the reference to Brown indicates a
concern with inferiority-type self-stigma.
3. Fullilove v. Klutznick
In Fullilove,1' the Supreme Court held a federally mandated ten
percent set-aside for minority subcontractors valid"°2 under the
"equal protection component" of the Fifth Amendment's Due
96. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360 (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
98. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
99. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 372 (Brennan, J.) ("Since separation of school-children by race
'generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone,' the conclusion is ines-
capable that applicants to medical school must be few indeed .... (citation omitted)).
100. Id. at 375.
101. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
102. Id. at 492.
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Process Clause.' The plurality opinion did not address the concept
of stigma in reaching the conclusion that the program was
constitutionally valid, but several of the other opinions did address
that question.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
concurred in the judgment but argued for application of the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard proposed by Brennan in Bakke.' 4 Beyond
regurgitating many of Brennan's va ue notions of stigmatization in
Bakke with attendant imprecision,10 Marshall invoked portions of
that opinion which placed importance on inferiority-type other-
stigma suffered by powerless nonbeneficiares."6 Marshall also
added some cryptic language of his own:
That the set-aside creates a quota in favor of qualified and
available minority business enterprises does not necessar-
ily indicate that it stigmatizes. . . . The set-aside . . . is
carefully tailored to remedy racial discrimination while at
the same time avoiding stigmatization and [penalization
of] those least able to protect themselves in the political
process. Since under the set-aside provision a contract may
be awarded to a minority enterprise only if it is qualified to
do the work, the provision stigmatizes as inferior neither a
minority firm that benefits from it nor a nonminority firm
that is burdened by it.
0 7
As discussed previously, 8 the qualification issue, at least with
respect to the beneficiaries, indicates a concern with other-stigma,
103. Id. at 473.
104. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring).
105. For example, Marshall wrote that in Bakke, he and those who joined Brennan's
opinion "firmly adhered to 'the cardinal principle that racial classifications that stig-
matize-because they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to
another or because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and sepa-
ratism-are invalid without more,'" Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 518 (Marshall, J.) (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)), that
"governmental programs employing racial classifications for remedial purposes can
be crafted to avoid stigmatization," Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J.), and that "
'any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group.'" id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 357-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). This commentary is
decidedly unclear as to what Marshall means by "stigmatize" or "stigmatization."
106. "[Rlace has often been used to stigmatize politically powerless segments of
society, and ... efforts to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination could be based
on paternalistic stereotyping .. " Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J.) (citing Bakke,
438 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J.)). See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text for an
explanation of why this formulation indicates a concern with whether powerless non-
beneficiaries suffer from inferiority-type other-stigma.
107. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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and Marshall's attention to inferiority as the underlying negative
attribution is explicit. Thus, he was at least concerned with
inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries.
But Marshall's reasoning with respect to stigmatization of a
nonminority firm seems nonsensical. Stated in reverse, if beneficiar-
ies are not qualified, nonbeneficiaries are stigmatized. The only
possible sensible meaning of that argument is that the nonbeneficiar-
ies would feel or be marked as even more inferior than the
beneficiaries because the beneficiary rather than the nonbeneficiary
firm was selected-certainly a novel argument and one probably
worth discounting as ill-considered. If not, the argument invokes
notions of powerful nonbeneficiaries experiencing inferiority-type
self-stigma, other-stigma, or both, even though everyone apparently
would know that the beneficiaries were unqualified.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, favoring
instead a "colorblind" approach to race-based classifications.'
Justice Stewart's only reference to stigma was a quote from Justice
Powell's lead opinion in Bakke,'" which, as described previously,"'
indicated a focus on inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by
powerless beneficiaries.
Justice Stevens also dissented, disparaging each of what he
identified as four justifications advanced for the set-aside provision
at issue."' Placed in the broader context of one of these-increased
minority participation in the economy-he conceived of a stigmatic
strain of inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless
beneficiaries: "[A]n absolute preference that is unrelated to a
minority firm's ability to perform a contract inevitably will engender
resentment on the part of competitors excluded from the market for
a purely racial reason and skepticism on the part of customers and
suppliers aware of the statutory classification." 3 The "minority
firm" represents the powerless beneficiary class, "skepticism"
explicitly refers to others and implies an underlying attribution of
inferiority. Stevens further declared that "a statute of this kind
109. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. " '[Pireferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth.' "Id. at 531 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 298 (Powell, J.)).
111. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
112. Stevens considered each of the following four justifications: (1) providing
reparation for past injuries to the beneficiary class, (2) providing a remedy to the spe-
cific beneficiary firms that were injured by discrimination in the past, (3) providing
minority subcontractors with a "piece of the action" in contracting, and (4) fostering
greater minority participation in the economy. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id. at 545.
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inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that
those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in
some respect that is identified purely by their race. . . . [T]hat
perception . . . can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial
prejudice .. ..""' Although either beneficiaries or nonbeneficiaries
could be included in the "many" to whom Stevens refers, leaving
both self-stigma and other-stigma as potential meanings, the second
sentence implies inferiority-type other-stigma. Self-sti ,ma would
only tangentially, if at all, contribute to racial prejudice."
4. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
In Wygant,n 6 a fractured Court held a state-sponsored layoff
preference for minority teachers invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."7
Only Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, mentioned stigmatization. He noted that Justice Powell
had, in Bakke, "called for a 'principle for deciding whether preferen-
tial classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent
stigmatic classification.' ,,8 No precise conception of what Marshall
meant by stigma can be derived from this oblique reference. One
could speculate, however, that he was unconcerned by racial classi-
fications that benefit the powerless, i.e., minorities. Therefore, any
affirmative action plan established by the powerful for the benefit of
the powerless would not involve a "malevolent stigmatic classifica-
tion" absent an intent by the powerful to stigmatize the powerless.
5. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., a divided Court held that
strict scrutiny applies to all state-sponsored affirmative action pro-
grams when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Applying that standard of review, the
Court struck down a municipal set-aside program designed to
benefit minority subcontractors.Y
114. Id.
115. See Morrison, supra note 22, 313, 340 n.184 (attributing to Stevens a concern
that "others see affirmative action beneficiaries as inferior").
116. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
117. Id. at 269-70, 284.
118. Id. at 311 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 294-95 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
119. Id. at 493-94 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 511.
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In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy, invoked
stigmatization and focused upon the strain of inferiority-type other-
stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries. To this end, she
practically echoed Justice Stevens' comments in Fullilove:
"Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility."'2 1 She also quoted Justice Powell's Bakke opinion in
which he addressed the strain of inferiority-type other-stigma
suffered by powerless beneficiaries. 22
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and in portions of
Justice O'Connor's opinion. He differed from the plurality by taking
the position that other interests besides remedying past discrimina-
tion could suffice to justify affirmative action, 23 but he found the
program at issue in Croson lacking.24 On the subject of stigma, he
raised the by now familiar refrain that powerless beneficiaries may
125be subjected to inferiority-type other-stigma.
Significantly, Justice Stevens also invoked a strain of
stigmatization which was novel in that no Justice in any of the
previous affirmative action cases, let alone in Plessy or Brown, had
raised it. He wrote that "[tihere is a special irony in the stereotypical
thinking that prompts legislation of this kind. Although it
stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of
past racial discrimination, it actually imposes a greater stigma on its1 r- • ,,126
supposed beneficiaries. Stevens' treatment of three of the four
elements comprising constitutionally significant stigmatization was
not unusual.P The power held by 28 and the distributive posture' 29 of
the stigmatized group in his conception are apparent, for the
"disadvantaged class" obviously refers to the class of powerful
121. Id. at 493. Compare supra text accompanying note 114.
122. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion) (" '[P]referential programs may
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection based on a factor having no relation to individual
worth.'" (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell,
J.)).
123. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124. Id. at511-12.
125. " '[Elven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of
this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who
are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified
purely by their race.'" Id. at 517 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
126. Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. See supra Part I.&1-4.
128. See supra Part I.A.3.
129. See supra Part I.A.4.
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nonbeneficiaries, i.e., Whites. Stevens was imprecise as to the source
of the underlying negative attribution,' 30 but his use of the term
"charge" evokes notions of others' attitudes. What was particularly
surprising and novel was his treatment of the underlying negative
attribution element itself.13 1 Although the term "stigmatization" had
always been understood to embody attributions of inferiority,
Stevens used it in a completely different sense: as embodying
attributions of racism. As it turns out, this novel idea assumes
considerable importance in the Court's most recent affirmative
action decisions, although not for Justice Stevens himself.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented. With respect to stigmatization, Marshall merely quoted a
portion of his opinion in Fullilove; a portion from which no clear
meaning can be derived and which fails to identify any particular
strain of stigma.32
6. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting,133 the Supreme Court, applying interme-
diate scrutiny,3 upheld' 3s two FCC radio station licensing policies
that manifested a preference for minority ownership.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, exclusively focused on
inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries:
Minority broadcasters, both those who obtain their licenses
by means of the minority ownership policies and those
who do not, are not stigmatized as inferior by the Com-
mission's programs. Audiences do not know a
broadcaster's race and have no reason to speculate about
how he or she obtained a license; each broadcaster is
judged on the merits of his or her programming. Further-
more, minority licensees must satisfy otherwise applicable
FCC qualifications requirements. 37
130. See supra Part I.A.2.
131. See supra Part I.A.1.
132. "'[G]overmmental programs employing racial classifications for remedial pur-
poses can be crafted to avoid stigmatization' .... City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). See supra note 105 for a discus-
sion of Marshall's vagueness with respect to stigma in Fullilove.
133. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
134. See id. at 565; see also supra text accompanying note 88.
135. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 600.
136. See id. at 552.
137. Id. at 596 n.49.
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As discussed previously,138 Brennan's focus on "minority broadcast-
ers" reflects concern with the class of powerless beneficiaries. His
attention to the usual underlying negative attribution-inferiority-
is explicit, and his focus on audience judgment clearly indicates that
other-stigma is the relevant source. Significantly, the Court's identi-
fication of inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless
beneficiaries marked the first time a majority of the Court recognized
a precise stigmatic strain in an affirmative action case.
Justice Stevens concurred, emphasizing that a majority of the
Court had finally endorsed his view that something other than
remedying past discrimination could justify affirmative action as a
constitutional matter.39 He also echoed the majority's focus on infe-
riority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries.
Although he wrote in vague terms--"Neither the favored nor the
disfavored class is stigmatized in any way"14-the authorities on
which he relied indicate that, at least with respect to beneficiaries, he
shared the majority's particular concern.'4' Stevens also implicitly
repeated his novel invocation in Croson of racism as a relevant un-
derlying negative attribution of constitutionally significant
stigmatization.42
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissented, favoring strict scrutiny of all
race-based classifications whether "benign" or "invidious."' 4'
O'Connor took a broad view of stigmatization:
[Race-based classifications] may embody stereotypes that
treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating
their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-
138. See supra text following note 94.
139. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 601.
141. Justice Stevens cited his own opinions in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 516-17 (1989) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 & n.17 (1980).
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). Part of the text re-
ferred to in Croson indicates a concern with whether powerless beneficiaries suffer
from inferiority-type other-stigma. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. The text
in Fullilove makes note of the same concern. See supra notes 113-114 and accompany-
ing text; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" '[E]ven
preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although in-
tended to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply to some
the recipients' inferiority and especial need for protection.'" (quoting United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part))).
142. The Croson text cited by Stevens in support of his broad statement that
"[nleither the favored nor the disfavored class is stigmatized in any way," Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17),
refers to stigmatization of nonbeneficiaries only in this novel racism sense. See supra
notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
143. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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according to a criterion barred to the Government by his-
tory and the Constitution. Racial classifications, whether
providing benefits to or burdening particular racial or
ethnic groups, may stigmatize those groups singled out for
different treatment ....
As indicated by the reference to stereotyping,45 O'Connor probably
was concerned with other- rather than self-stigma. It appears that
she intentionally drew no distinction between beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries, and implicitly failed to distinguish between pow-
erful and powerless groups.
The most interesting issue raised by O'Connor's dissent is
whether she shared in Justice Stevens' conception of a strain of
stigma underlain by attributions of racism. It is possible that indi-
viduals' "thoughts and efforts" could refer to such attributions.
More likely, given her elucidation of those individuals' "very worth
as citizens," she meant inferiority. Thus, to the extent O'Connor's
view of stigma can be pigeonholed into any of the sixteen potential
strains of constitutionally significant stigmatization identified previ-
ously, 146 she seemed to give credence broadly to four: inferiority-type
other-stigma, whether suffered by (1) powerless nonbeneficiaries, (2)
powerless beneficiaries, (3) powerful nonbeneficiaries, or (4) power-
ful beneficiaries.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, also dissented, ex-
plaining why in his view the program at issue would fail strict
scrutiny. 47 Kennedy clearly expressed concern with inferiority-type
other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries:
[A] plan of the type sustained here may impose "stigma on
its supposed beneficiaries," and "foster intolerance and
antagonism against the entire membership of the favored
classes." Although the majority disclaims it, the FCC policy
seems based on the demeaning notion that members of the
defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views'
that must be different from those of other citizens. Special
preferences also can foster the view that members of the
favored groups are inherently less able to compete on their
148own.
144. Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
145. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 633-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 635-36 (citations omitted); see Morrison, supra note 22, at 340 n.184
(attributing to Kennedy the concern that "others see affirmative action beneficiaries as
inferior"). That Kennedy was concerned with other- rather than self-stigma is clearly
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Additionally, Kennedy joined in Justice Stevens' conception of ra-
cism-type other-stigma suffered by powerful nonbeneficiaries,
writing that "[tihere is the danger that the 'stereotypical thinking'
that prompts policies such as the FCC rules here 'stigmatizes the
disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial dis-
crimination.' ,'49 Thus, although the Court upheld the affirmative
action programs at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Stevens had
planted an idea-that the relevant stigma includes Whites stigma-
tized by charges of past racism-in Croson which began to take hold
in the Court's jurisprudence in Metro Broadcasting. That idea became
a definite part of the Court's jurisprudence in its most recent af-
firmative action decision, as the following discussion illustrates.
7. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Recently, in Adarand,'s° the Supreme Court addressed financial
incentives favoring employment of minority subcontractors in fed-
eral highway construction projects.151 The Court overruled Metro
Broadcasting and held that even federal "benign" race-based classifi-
cations are subject to strict scrutiny.'52
Adarand marked the second time that a majority of the Court
adopted a particular stigmatic strain in an affirmative action case.53
The Court did so in two ways. First, the majority concerned itself
with the by now common strain of inferiority-type other-stigma suf-
fered by powerless beneficiaries. Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor quoted from Justice Stevens' Fullilove'M dissent: " '[A]
statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an
assumption that those who are granted this special preference are
less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their
race.' ,,55 As established earlier, this language identifies the strain of
inferiority-type other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries."'
Second, the Court invoked stigma as a notion of powerful non-
beneficiaries experiencing racism-type other-stigma. In support,
shown by his conjecture that "[plerhaps the tolerance and decency to which our peo-
ple aspire will let the disfavored rise above hostility and the favored escape
condescension." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). Condescension,
in this context, certainly refers to attributions by others rather than the self.
149. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
150. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
151. Id. at 2101-02.
152. Id. at 2117.
153. Metro Broadcasting was the first. See supra Part II.B.6.
154. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
155. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
156. See supra notes 113-114, 125 and accompanying text.
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O'Connor drew upon this strain's genesis: Justice Stevens' Croson57
concurrence: "Although [the legislation at issue] stigmatizes the dis-
advantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial
discrimination, it actually imposes a greater stigma on its supposed
beneficiaries.""' 8 It is significant and perhaps surprising, given the
infrequency with which a majority of the Court had ever precisely
invoked particular stigmatic strains as constitutionally significant
issues, that a strain so far removed from the sort contemplated in the
progenitor Plessy and Brown cases ultimately has received the
Court's endorsement.
Justice Thomas concurred. Like the majority of which he was a
part, he invoked a concept of stigma as involving inferiority-type
other-stigma suffered by powerless beneficiaries: "So-called 'benign'
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender
attitudes of superiority ....
Thomas also recognized the strain of stigma that is perhaps
closest to that recognized in Plessy and Brown, marking the first time
since Justice Douglas' DeFunis dissent that any Justice had taken
notice of it. This strain, inferiority-type self-stigma suffered by pow-
erless beneficiaries, differs from the Plessy/Brown strain only in the
distributive posture of the stigmatized group:1 60 the former refers to
beneficiaries while the latter refers to nonbeneficiaries. Thomas
wrote that "[tihese programs stamp minorities with a badge of infe-
riority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an
attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences.' 61 His focus on the
underlying negative attribution of inferiority and on the group of
powerless beneficiaries-minority recipients of affirmative action-
is explicit. As to the source of the underlying negative attribution,
Thomas focused on the beneficiary group's own attributions, for he
lumped the "badge of inferiority" with other purported self-induced
attitudinal effects: development of dependencies or attitudes of en-
titlement.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, taking is-
sue with the analytical approach the majority used to justify strict
scrutiny.'62 With respect to stigma, Stevens acknowledged although
157. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
158. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113-14 (quoting Croson, 488 at 516-17 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)) (alteration in original).
159. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. See supra Part I.A.4.
161. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
162. See id. at 2120-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Breyer also dis-
sented. Justice Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Breyer,
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ultimately dismissed the strain of inferiority-type self-stigma suf-
fered by powerful beneficiaries that Justice Thomas recognized.
Stevens noted, "No beneficiaries of the specific program under at-
tack today have challenged its constitutionality-perhaps because
they do not find the preferences stigmatizing .... Even assuming
that the beneficiaries did feel stigmatized, however, Stevens was
"not persuaded that the psychological damage brought on by af-
firmative action is as severe as that engendered by racial
subordination."1'
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The opinions of the Court or its members have focused on dif-
ferent strains of stigma by virtue of the four different elements, or
"variables," identified previously."" In fact, as shown in Table 3, all
but one potential strain of inferiority-type stigma, that of self-stigma
suffered by powerful beneficiaries of a race-based classification,
have been recognized at one time or another in the Supreme Court's
166
affirmative action cases.
Analysis of the elements which the Court and individual Jus-
tices have focused on in each case reveals several interesting points,
both with respect to individual Justices' notions6 7 and to particular
which did not address stigma as a justification for their views. See id. at 2131-34
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg's
separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, did not address the question. See
id. at 2134-36.
163. Id. at 2122 n.5.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part I.A.
166. With respect to inferiority-type self-stigma, that suffered by powerless benefi-
ciaries was recognized by Justice Douglas in DeFunis, see supra Part II.B.1, and Justices
Thomas and Stevens in Adarand, see supra Part II.B.7; that suffered by powerless non-
beneficiaries by Justice Brennan in Bakke, see supra Part II.B.2; and that suffered by
powerful nonbeneficiaries by Justice Brennan in Bakke, see id., and arguably by Justice
Marshall in Fullilove. See supra Part II.B.3. With respect to inferiority-type other-stigma,
that suffered by powerless beneficiaries was recognized by the Justices listed infra
note 171; that suffered by powerless nonbeneficiaries by Justice Brennan in Bakke, see
supra Part II.B.2, Justice Marshall in Fullilove, see supra Part II.B.3, and Justice
O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting, see supra Part II.B.6; that suffered by powerful bene-
ficiaries by Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting, see supra Part II.B.6; and that
suffered by powerful nonbeneficiaries by Justice Brennan in Bakke, see supra Part II.B.2,
arguably Justice Marshall in Fullilove, see supra Part II.B.3, and Justice O'Connor in
Metro Broadcasting. See supra Part II.B.6.
167. For example, as shown in Table 3, Justice Brennan took what might be termed
the broadest view of stigmatization by invoking five separate strains. Justices Marshall
and O'Connor share second place, invoking four strains apiece. Of course, these
summaries include only opinions authored by those Justices; they have joined in the
opinions of others as well and may to a less definite degree be considered as also rec-
ognizing strains in those opinions. Due to our lack of confidence that an individual
Justice's decision to join an opinion necessarily indicates that the particular Justice
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stigmatic strains,'" which we identify but do not attempt to critique
fully here. Most significant, and therefore meriting extended dis-
cussion, are two shifts that have occurred in the Supreme Court's
use of stigmatization as a constitutional concept in the affirmative
action cases. We also offer a few comments on the "consistency" of
the Court's, and individual Justices', reliance on stigma as a consti-
tutional concept in affirmative action cases.
A. The Current, Predominant View Among the Justices of Constitutionally
Relevant Stigma Apparently is Inferiority-Type Other-Stigma
Suffered by Powerless Beneficiaries
As introduced into equal protection jurisprudence in Plessy and
Brown, the Supreme Court's initial concept of stigma was one of
powerless nonbeneficiaries of a race-based classification experiencing
inferiority-type self-stigma. Some aspects of this focus-on the pow-
erless rather than powerful class, on the nonbeneficiary rather than
the beneficiary class-are not surprising, for the cases were brought
by minorities challenging statutes under which they were victim-
ized.
In the affirmative action cases, in contrast, the Court's concept
of stigma has focused on a different strain-that of powerless benefici-
aries of a race-based classification suffering from inferiority-type
other-stigma. Table 4 depicts this transition in the Court's focus. At
least where feelings of inferiority are the feared underlying charac-
teristic, this strain is the only one that a majority of the Court has
invoked. 69 Additionally, this strain has been invoked most fre-
quently in the varied non-controlling Court opinions.170 Given that a
prevalent strain of stigma has emerged that differs from the con-
cept's origins, both in the distributive posture of the group whose
agrees with the strain of stigma identified by the opinion's author, we generally limit
our analysis to Justices who have authored opinions which discuss the concept of
stigma.
168. For example, it seems that any focus on inferiority-type stigma potentially
suffered by the powerful departs from Brown, for the self-stigma at issue there was
imposed largely by perceived and actual infliction on members of the powerless
group by the powerful group. Perhaps it is best described as a sense of helplessness.
See Casais, supra note 59, at 263.
169. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
170. The opinions include those of Justices Powell and Brennan in Bakke, see supra
Part II.B.2; Justices Marshall and Stewart in Fullilove, see supra Part II.B.3; Justice
Stevens in Fullilove, see supra Part II.B.3, Croson, see supra Part II.B.5, and Metro
Broadcasting, see supra Part II.B.6, Justice O'Connor in Croson, see supra Part II.B.5, and
Metro Broadcasting, see supra Part II.B.6; Justice Kennedy in Metro Broadcasting, see
supra Part II.B.6; and Justice Thomas in Adarand. See supra Part II.B.7.
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stigmatization is at issue17' and in the source of the underlying
negative attribution,172 the remaining issue is whether these differ-
ences are legally or practically significant.
1. The Shift in Focus as to Distributive Posture
While the Plessy/Brown strain of stigma focused upon non-
beneficiaries, the predominant focus in the affirmative action
cases-perhaps not surprisingly-has come to rest upon beneficiar-
ies. However, compelling arguments exist that, in the affirmative
action context, stigma should be legally irrelevant for beneficiaries.
First, as Justice Stevens suggested in his Adarand dissent, it may
make some sense to pay attention to the side of the debate on which
the particular plaintiffs lie." It may be condescending to tell mem-
bers of minority groups, "This program stigmatizes you," when
members of those groups generally have not raised the complaint
themselves. 75 Particularly when, as addressed shortly,76 the focus
seems to have changed to the opinions of others besides the benefi-
ciary group, this metamorphosis could be seen as a naked attempt to
add a stigmatization arrow to the anti-affirmative action quiver. Ba-
sically, the statement to minority-group members seems to be, "We
know you receive benefits under affirmative action programs, but
others think poorly of you when you do so. Because it is their opin-
ions, and not your own, that are legally relevant, you are forbidden
from receiving such benefits."
Second, an argument could be constructed that stigmatization
is an unsound basis on which to decide equal protection issues,
particularly in the affirmative action context. The Brown Court,
dealing with the issue of segregation, carried the concept of stigma
into the modern era and may be considered its true progenitor.'7
Accordingly, the Brown conception of stigma should govern.
Although the Brown Court invoked stigma in holding segregation
unconstitutional, the Court invalidated segregation because the
practice resulted in inferior treatment of African Americans
171. See supra Part I.A.4.
172. See supra Part I.A.1.
173. Moreover, as previously pointed out, it seems unlikely that the beneficiaries of
affirmative action would have standing to challenge such programs. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175. See Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2141 (1989) ("It is demeaning to be told what we
find demeaning.").
176. See infra Part III.A.2.
177. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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precisely because they were African American. 178 Thus, the Brown
Court's utilization of the concept was a necessary device to justify
ending school desegregation while paying lip service to traditional
stare decisis principles in light of Plessy. Thus, using stigmatization
where something other than inferior treatment, and in fact
preferential treatment, is at issue may pervert the concept's
constitutional relevance.
' Third, in the same way that the powerful group may suffer less
from the effects of stigmatization precisely because of its power,
both the beneficiary group and its individual members may suffer
less from the effects of stigmatization because the group or indi-
viduals receive the sought-after benefits of the classification. In
effect, they may be said to "trade" some level of stigmatization for a
greater level of benefits. Indeed, simple economic analysis would
suggest that minorities generally would decline to participate in af-
firmative action programs if the effects of stigmatization outweighed
the benefit of obtaining the job in question or being admitted to law
school, for example. Assuming that minorities are utility maximiz-
ers, one would not expect them to participate in programs that result
in a net decrease in utility. For the same reasons, one would not ex-
pect minorities as a group to advocate politically for affirmative
action programs if the result is a net loss in group utility, assuming
that the group's leaders' interests coincide with those of a majority
of the individual members. Where stigmatization of the nonbenefi-
ciary group is at issue, however, as in Brown, that stigmatization is
perhaps of greater concern: not only does the nonbeneficiary class
by definition receive no benefit from the classification, it may also
experience adverse stigmatizing effects.
2. The Shift in Focus as to the Underlying Negative
Attributions' Source
While the Plessy/Brown strain of stigma focused upon self-
imposed negative attributions, or self-stigma, the Court's predomi-
nant focus in the affirmative action cases has become the
attributions by others, or other-stigma. In addition to the theoretical
differences between self- and other-stigma described previously,79
there are practical ones as well. The issue is these differences' im-
pact on the shift in constitutional focus from one to the other.
178. See Aleinikoff, supra note 40, at 1113 (Brown "can quite sensibly be read to pro-
scribe not the mere use of race, but rather systemic state practices that impose harm
on a subordinated group"). See generally Washburn, supra note 3, at 1124-25.
179. See supra Part I.A.2.
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There are arguments that a constitutional focus on other-stigma
is sound. First, from a strictly economic perspective, the forced inte-
gration of racial groups may decrease the utility functions of Whites
in at least two ways: employers may have to pay higher wages to
white employees who prefer separation of the races and have alter-
native opportunities (a pecuniary cost to the employers) or white
employees who prefer not to associate with minorities but have no
feasible alternatives will be forced into an unwanted association (a
nonpecuniary cost to white employees).' Thus, as a purely economic
matter, affirmative action may create both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary costs which are traceable, essentially, to other-stigma.
On the other hand, many Whites favor affirmative action pro-
grams or, at least, suffer no disutility from associating with
minorities. Indeed, some Whites may receive a net utility increase
(usually in nonpecuniary form) from the existence of affirmative
action, negating some or (perhaps) all of the negative effect of other-
stigma felt by other Whites. On balance, it may be difficult to de-
termine whether the negative effects of other-stigma are significant
as a practical matter. In any event, other-stigma does capture some
potentially significant pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs associated
with affirmative action and for that reason could be a legitimate
consideration.
Second, some degree of self-stigma may arise from other-
stigma, for if other-stigmatization
occurs, it can have far-reaching consequences for the ca-
reers of those targeted by affirmative action efforts. The
negative expectations of these individuals that would be
spawned by a stigma of incompetence could cause dis-
torted perceptions of their behavior and work performance
and, if internalized by them, could actually create self-
fulfilling prophecies that bring about the very behavior
others expect1'81
Thus, to the extent other-stigma may cause self-stigma, focusing on
other-stigma focuses on both.
The arguments against giving constitutional import to other-
stigma, however, seem stronger than those supporting it. First, be-
cause it is far clearer that other-stigmatization of beneficiaries arises
from affirmative action than that self-stigmatization does, focusing
on other-stigma makes it easier to invalidate affirmative action pro-
grams. The empirical evidence of stigmatization's existence in the
affirmative action context may not be as contradictory as it ap-
180. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 659 (4th ed. 1992).
181. Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 543-44.
[VOL. 2:235
SPRING 1997] "Stigma" in Affirmative Action Cases
pears. 82 To an uncertain (and perhaps small) degree, it appears that
evidence cited to support stigmatization's existence tends actually to
refer to other-stigma, 83 while that cited to support its nonexistence
tends actually to refer to self-stigma.'4 Further, the proposed expla-
nations underlying the empirical evidence are more supportive of
other-stigma's existence than self-stigma's. Other-stigma may be
linked to the resentment felt by nonbeneficiaries in losing (or their
perceptions of losing) opportunities for position or advancement,""
misperceptions about affirmative action in general,' 6 or other
sources. But self-stigma may not arise, given a particular benefici-
ary's starting self-image, attitude toward affirmative action in
general (including viewing it as a remedy for past discrimination)
and identification of himself or herself with the beneficiary group
impact whether the beneficiary will think less of himself or herself
'87as a result of a particular program.
The discounting principle aptly accounts for the existence of
other-stigma in the affirmative action context. That principle
essentially holds that with each additional plausible alternative
explanation for a phenomenon, belief in prior alternative
explanations must diminish.'8 Other-stigma, although it may exist
independently in the form of racist stereotyping," 9 arises or
182. See sources cited supra note 7.
183. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1257; Garcia et al., supra note 7, at 436;
Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 543. Some of the literature suggests that many courses
maybe taken to lessen other-stigma arising from affirmative action. See, e.g., Crosby &
Clayton, supra note 7, at 68-69; Harris & Narayan, supra note 40, at 29-31; Nacoste,
supra note 7, at 186-87. This proposition, if accepted, undermines the argument that
focusing on other-stigma automatically leads to affirmative action's invalidation, for
other-stigma may not exist in a particular case. The Supreme Court, however, has
shown no interest in considering such measures or in adopting a highly case-specific
approach to affirmative action, and perhaps for good reason. For if other-stigma ex-
ists, at all, it seems an ill-advised and inappropriate standard for measuring the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs. Indeed, as we articulate in the textual
discussion following this note, it is not at all clear that other-stigma in general is of any
practical significance.
184. See, e.g., Crosby & Clayton, supra note 7, at 66; Strossen, supra note 7, at 975.
185. See, e.g., Feagins, supra note 2, at 10-11.
186. See Harris & Narayan, supra note 40, at 31; Nacoste, supra note 7, at 185-86.
187. See Crosby & Clayton, supra note 7, at 70-71. Compare GOFFMAN, supra note 20,
at 6:
[Ilt seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively
demand of him, and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by
his alienation, protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a full-
fledged normal human being .... He bears a stigma but does not seem to be
impressed or repentant about doing so.
188. See, e.g., Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 543; Garcia et al., supra note 7, at 432.
189. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 343 ("[A]ffirmative action did not cause stigma
to attach to selected racial groups; society had already taken care of that."); Crenshaw,
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increases because "affirmative action does serve to discount the role
of ability in explaining the success of minority group members and
augment the lac[k] of ability in explaining their failure."'1 9 In other
words, because some alternative to merit" reasonably explains the
minority group member's position or promotion, merit, the
presumptive explanation, necessarily diminishes as the
explanation. 92
The discounting principle does not require that beneficiaries
self-stigmatize as a result of affirmative action. As far as the benefi-
ciary group is concerned, a host of plausible explanations exist for
the classification which are not exclusive of merit, but which are ex-
clusive of inferiority. Among these are remedying past
discrimination,93 combating present (through exposure) and future
supra note 56, at 1362. The argument that negative attributions toward affirmative
action beneficiaries are merely manifestations of racial bias does not wholly ring true.
Certainly some nonbeneficiaries are racist, and their opinions that beneficiaries are
inferior arise from those pre-existing sentiments. But persons selected to positions on
any ground other than proven merit or potential merit are subject to suspicions about
their capabilities. This is true of the daughter of the rich alumnus who gains admit-
tance to a prestigious academic program or the partner's son who is chosen for an
associate position. The difference between these "beneficiaries" and those of affirma-
tive action simply may be that the latter are easier to identify. The mere awareness
that something other than merit was a factor suffices, even without any preconceived
notions as to the capabilities of the individual.
190. Garcia et al., supra note 7, at 436; see also Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1257 (citing
a 1975 Carnegie study indicating that a majority of professors and graduate students
believe that "affirmative action labels minorities in such a way that they never can be
judged on merit alone"); Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 542 (finding support for the
idea "that a stigma of incompetence accompanies the affirmative action label"); PAUL
M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 134 (1993) ("[Tihe reactions of
white Americans to affirmative action are in no way unique. Proposing to privilege
some people rather than others, on the basis of a characteristic they were born with,
violates a nearly universal norm of fairness. It is in just this sense that differences over
affirmative action go beyond race.").
191. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 330-34, for a discussion of the various possible
meanings of "merit." In any organization in which output is the primary goal, of
course, merit means only "actual results." See id. at 330. Thus, those who argue that
"merit" may have alternative meanings that allow race to be positively taken into ac-
count, or those who argue that viewing "merit" in efficiency or productivity terms is
merely a white construct, cf. Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 1358 ("The most significant
aspect of Black oppression seems to be what is believed about Black Americans, not
what Black Americans believe. Black people are boxed in largely because there is a
consensus among many Whites that the oppression of Blacks is legitimate. This is
where consensus and coercion can be understood together: ideology convinces one
group that the coercive domination of another is legitimate."); GOFFMAN, supra note
20, at 131 ("the very notion of shameful differences assumes a similarity in regard to
crucial beliefs."). Rightly or wrongly, White-based or Black-based, the alternative pre-
sented by selection based on race diminishes belief that selection was based on
efficiency.
192. See Heilman et al., supra note 7, at 543.
193. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 50-51.
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(through generational attitude adjustment) discrimination,'94 and
promoting diversity.9 But, discounting helps explain why power-
less nonbeneficiaries of invidious racial classifications such as
segregation experience self-stigma, for a sort of inverse discounting
phenomenon may occur in which self-stigma arises because there is
no alternative explanation to attributed inferiority for the classifica-
tion. Essentially, the powerless nonbeneficiaries may think along the
following syllogistic lines: "The other group wishes to exclude us. If
we were their equal, they would want to include us. Thus, we must
be inferior."
Second, it seems at least odd and at most duplicitous to assign
legal, and especially constitutional, significance to opinions that oth-
ers may hold. 96 Doing so is certainly a departure from precedent.
Also, in the same way that beneficiaries ought to be considered the
primary authorities on whether they are stigmatized, the controlling
type of stigma ought to be that experienced by beneficiaries them-
selves, not that experienced by others. If all that is required to
invalidate a program is others' disfavor, then the program's oppo-
nents have an easy task indeed. After all, every classification
discriminates, at least in the sense that some persons are treated dif-
ferently than others. 97 It seems a novel proposition that the opinions
of those "others" should be considered determinative or even ger-
mane as to whether the classification is constitutionally valid.
Third, assuming that inferiority is the relevant underlying
negative attribution, other-stigma is definitely less relevant than self-
stigma. A self-stigma of inferiority causes inequality almost by
definition, for it seems to provide automatically negative and detri-
mental effects with the end result that the subject group effectively
removes itself from euaity.198 Not only may other-stigma not even
translate into action, it has no necessary bearing on the equality
issue. For example, consider an individual who has received a posi-
tion through affirmative action. Even assuming that others view the
194. See generally Nacoste, supra note 7, at 188.
195. See Aleinikoff, supra note 40, at 1092; Ward, supra note 88, at 100-101; see gen-
erally Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of
"Diversity ", 1993 WiS. L. REV. 105.
196. But see Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982) (discussing the
severe psychological harms to the self that can be caused by racial stigmatization by
others).
197. See Brest, supra note 59, at 11 ("[A] presumption prohibiting all decisions that
stigmatize or cumulatively disadvantage particular individuals would affect an enor-
mously wide range of practices important to the efficient operation of a complex
industrial society.").
198. Cf. Delgado, supra note 196, at 136-39.
199. E.g., HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 44 (1985)
(citing survey data).
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individual as inferior as a result, their negative view alone does not
give rise to "inequality" in any meaningful or typical sense of that
word, especially as compared to self-attributions of inferiority.
B. Novel but Unfounded and Unsound Underlying
Negative Attribution-Racism-Has Emerged
Another stigmatic strain, one far removed from the origins of
Plessy and Brown, also has surfaced in the affirmative action cases-
that of racism-type other-stigma suffered by powerful nonbeneficiar-
ies of a race-based classification."' This strain originated with Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion in Croson.°" Both Stevens and Jus-
tice Kennedy raised it in their opinions in Metro Broadcasting, and a
majority of the Court recognized this strain in Adarand .
The new focus on racism as a constitutionally significant under-
lying attribution is both unfounded and unsound. It is unfounded
because, at a minimum, it is vastly different from the inferiority-type
stigma emphasized in Plessy and Brown. Table 5 demonstrates the
significance of the shift from inferiority to racism. The distinction
between the two attributions is so clear that invoking what has be-
come a legal term of art--"stigma"-to encompass both notions is at
least disingenuous and at most deceptive.
The focus on racism stigma is unsound for several reasons.
First, and broadly, it is unsound because it has nothing to do with
the root issue of equality which explicitly underlies both the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and
antidiscrimination statutes. A forced sense of inferiority, as
discussed previously, is related intrinsically to equality. If the state
proclaims one group inferior to another, the two groups cannot be
legally equal. An attribution of racism, however, has no necessary
bearing on legal equality; racist attitudes can exist without any
outward official actions or legal consequences that necessarily
subvert principles of equality.2"
200. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 343-44.
201. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 516; supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 142, 149 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
204. Morrison proposes that
[t]he stigma arguments are in collision with essential individualism. Attempts
to avoid that collision merely reveal that racial guilt is at the core of essential
individualism. If society and history already have labeled African-Americans
and other minorities as inferior, the driving force behind the stigma argument
must be the concern about the stigma of racism applying to all Euro-
Americans.
Morrison, supra note 22, at 344.
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Second, and more narrowly, the stigmatic strain raised by
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and the Adarand majority is one of
past racism. Even if one accepts the proposition that a stigma of
present racism may have negative effects perhaps by, for example,
causing those so stigmatized to engage in a self-fulfilling prophecy
or by lowering their social standing or self-esteem, it seems a stretch
to fear genuine, palpable negative effects from a stigma of past
racism. Indeed, such a "mark" or attribution may have salutary
effects such as causing the previously discriminating group to
improve its conduct in the future.
Third, again applying economic analysis, it is difficult to see
why the powerful group would, in effect, voluntarily do itself more
harm than good. Indeed, the notion that Whites as a group would
create affirmative action programs that result in significant de-
creases in Whites' utility as a group seems fanciful, at best. Rather, it
appears more likely that Whites as a group either receive utility
gains from affirmative action or, at the least, suffer no significant
decrease. In either event, the Court's newly discovered racism-type
stigma should not provide a justification for dismantling affirmative
action.
C. Is the Supreme Court Consistent in Its Reliance on Stigma as a
Constitutional Concept in Affirmative Action Cases?
Our final observations regarding the model deal with the ques-
tion whether the Supreme Court and individual Justices have acted
consistently in relying on stigma as a constitutional concept. Table 3
provides the essential information. From Table 3, three propositions
of some interest emerge.
First, it is difficult to say whether the Court has been consistent in
its recognition of constitutionally significant strains of stigma. As
Table 3 reveals, the Court has endorsed at least three different
strains: (1) inferiority-type self-stigma suffered by powerless
nonbeneficiaries (Plessy and Brown); (2) inferiority-type other-stigma
suffered by powerless beneficiaries (Metro Broadcasting); and (3)
other-type others-stigma suffered by powerful nonbeneficiaries
(Adarand).°s Individual Justices have endorsed no less than eight
strains of stigma.0 These various strains, however, are not
necessarily inconsistent in any analytical sense; they are simply
different. Thus, the model does not really tell us whether the Court
205. See supra Table 3 at p. 269.
206. Id. For purposes of applying the model, we attribute the views of stigma set
forth in any particular opinion only to the author of the opinion and not to any Justice
who simply joined the opinion.
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and individual Justices should be considered consistent or
inconsistent in this respect.
Second, looking solely at voting records, and putting to one
side Justice Douglas (who participated only in DeFunis) and Justices
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer (who have participated only
in Adarand), it is apparent that virtually all of the Justices have been
consistent with respect to outcome. For example, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy have always voted against the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action programs that have come before
the Court while Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Powell and Blackmun
always voted in favor of them. Only White and Stevens have voted
to uphold some programs while voting to strike down others. Thus,




Third, and lastly, Justice Thomas and Justice Douglas, despite
their vastly differing judicial philosophies, are the two Justices who
have most strongly and clearly invoked a Plessy/Brown strain of
stigma in the affirmative action context. Indeed, both identified in-
feriority-type self-stigma as the critical inquiry. Although Justice
Thomas' strongly worded opinion in Adarand has much to com-
mend it as a statement against wide-ranging affirmative action
policies, his reliance on inferiority-type self-stigma-when the stig-
matized group is the beneficiary of the discrimination-runs into
significant difficulties under current standing doctrine, as discussed
previously.2 8 In any event, Justice Thomas' Adarand concurrence
provides the clearest exposition of the Plessy/Brown concept of
constitutionally relevant stigma in the affirmative action context.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court frequently has invoked "stigma" as a sig-
nificant factor in determining the constitutionality of race-based
classifications, including both segregation and affirmative action. A
review of the cases, however, reveals that "stigma" has meant differ-
ent things to different Justices, to the Court as a whole, and at
different times, depending on four elements: (1) the negative attribu-
tion underlying the stigma charged, (2) the source of that negative
attribution relative to the stigmatized group, (3) the power held by
that group, and (4) the distributive posture of that group. The Court's
initial constitutional concept of "stigma," which originated in Plessy
207. The foregoing propositions, that individual Justices have invoked many strains
of stigma while voting for consistent outcomes, bring to mind the venerable maxim of
judicial opinion writing: "Any stick to beat a dog."
208. See supra notes 42, 174.
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v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, focused upon the par-
ticular strain of inferiority-type self-stigma suffered by powerless
nonbeneficiaries.
In the affirmative action cases of the past twenty years, how-
ever, the Court's concept of "stigma" has developed differently in
two critical respects. First, the predominant view in the affirmative
action cases, as demonstrated in Table 4 above, is that the constitu-
tionally significant strain of stigma is inferiority-type other-stigma
by powerless beneficiaries, i.e., members of the preferred minority
group. This strain differs from the Plessy/Brown strain in both the
source of the underlying negative attribution-others besides the
stigmatized group make the attribution, generally Whites-and the
distributive posture of the stigmatized group-they are the beneficiar-
ies of affirmative action rather than the nonbeneficiaries of, for
example, state-enforced segregation. Second, the Court has con-
ferred constitutional significance on an entirely new strain of stigma.
This new "racism" strain is one in which inferiority is not the "mark"
conferred upon the group at issue, but rather is one where the issue is
perceived past racism of the powerful nonbeneficiary group (i.e.,
Whites).
Each of these fundamental changes is subject to serious
criticism; we have not attempted to exhaust the potential difficulties.
An important point is that the Court itself generally has not
explained or justified these changes. Rather, the Court, as well as
individual Justices, has invoked the talisman of "stigma" carelessly
and sometimes in apparent pursuit of outcome-driven ends. We
conclude by inquiring: Is it too much to expect the Supreme Court of
the United States to specify and explain its real concerns in
affirmative action cases, even if that means an end to the talismanic
effect of the terms "stigma" and "stigmatization"?
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